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HighlandTiger

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HighlandTiger last won the day on August 29

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  1. Probably the Most Important Post You Will Read This Year! This has just been posted this evening by the Spectator. It lays out the exact position of the Govt in negotiations with the EU. it comes from a very DOMinant source in No.10. Please share, and share, and share this.. Thats what No.10 wants us to do... they wouldn't have spilled this info if they didn't.. They want the EU to have a reality check. Thank you in anticipation.. I can smell that sweet smell of success wafting towards us. AS FOLLOWS:: Earlier today, I sent a message to a contact in Number 10 asking them how the Brexit talks were going. They sent a long reply which I think gives a pretty clear sense of where they think things are. So, in the interest of trying to let people understand where Number 10 reckon the negotiations are, here is their response: ‘The negotiations will probably end this week. Varadkar doesn’t want to negotiate. Varadkar was keen on talking before the Benn Act when he thought that the choice would be ‘new deal or no deal’. Since the Benn Act passed he has gone very cold and in the last week the official channels and the backchannels have also gone cold. Varadkar has also gone back on his commitments — he said if we moved on manufactured goods then he would also move but instead he just attacked us publicly. It’s clear he wants to gamble on a second referendum and that he’s encouraging Barnier to stick to the line that the UK cannot leave the EU without leaving Northern Ireland behind. There are quite a few people in Paris and Berlin who would like to discuss our offer but Merkel and Macron won’t push Barnier unless Ireland says it wants to negotiate. Those who think Merkel will help us are deluded. As things stand, Dublin will do nothing, hoping we offer more, then at the end of this week they may say ‘OK, let’s do a Northern Ireland only backstop with a time limit’, which is what various players have been hinting at, then we’ll say No, and that will probably be the end. Varadkar thinks that either there will be a referendum or we win a majority but we will just put this offer back on the table so he thinks he can’t lose by refusing to compromise now. Given his assumptions, Varadkar’s behaviour is arguably rational but his assumptions are, I think, false. Ireland and Brussels listen to all the people who lost the referendum, they don’t listen to those who won the referendum and they don’t understand the electoral dynamics here. If this deal dies in the next few days, then it won’t be revived. To marginalise the Brexit Party, we will have to fight the election on the basis of ‘no more delays, get Brexit done immediately’. They thought that if May went then Brexit would get softer. It seems few have learned from this mistake. They think we’re bluffing and there’s nothing we can do about that, not least given the way May and Hammond constantly talked tough then folded. So, if talks go nowhere this week, the next phase will require us to set out our view on the Surrender Act. The Act imposes narrow duties. Our legal advice is clear that we can do all sorts of things to scupper delay which for obvious reasons we aren’t going into details about. Different lawyers see the “frustration principle” very differently especially on a case like this where there is no precedent for primary legislation directing how the PM conducts international discussions. We will make clear privately and publicly that countries which oppose delay will go the front of the queue for future cooperation — cooperation on things both within and outside EU competences. Those who support delay will go to the bottom of the queue. [This source also made clear that defence and security cooperation will inevitably be affected if the EU tries to keep Britain in against the will of its government] Supporting delay will be seen by this government as hostile interference in domestic politics, and over half of the public will agree with us. We will also make clear that this government will not negotiate further so any delay would be totally pointless. They think now that if there is another delay we will keep coming back with new proposals. This won’t happen. We’ll either leave with no deal on 31 October or there will be an election and then we will leave with no deal. ‘When they say ‘so what is the point of delay?’, we will say “This is not our delay, the government is not asking for a delay — Parliament is sending you a letter and Parliament is asking for a delay but official government policy remains that delay is an atrocious idea that everyone should dismiss. Any delay will in effect be negotiated between you, Parliament, and the courts — we will wash our hands of it, we won’t engage in further talks, we obviously won’t given any undertakings about cooperative behaviour, everything to do with ‘duty of sincere cooperation’ will be in the toilet, we will focus on winning the election on a manifesto of immediately revoking the entire EU legal order without further talks, and then we will leave. Those who supported delay will face the inevitable consequences of being seen to interfere in domestic politics in a deeply unpopular way by colluding with a Parliament that is as popular as the clap. Those who pushed the Benn Act intended to sabotage a deal and they’ve probably succeeded. So the main effect of it will probably be to help us win an election by uniting the leave vote and then a no deal Brexit. History is full of such ironies and tragedies.’ Now, this is—obviously—only one side of the negotiations view of things. It does, though, make clear Downing Street’s pessimism about getting a deal this week and its thinking about how to handle the coming extension and election campaign. https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/10/how-number-10-view-the-state-of-the-negotiations/
  2. Gold in USD has risen 1.2% over the last 24 hours, 1.6% in GBP
  3. You can always rely on a late night Trump tweet to affect the markets.
  4. Answers Leave, No. I have worked and experienced life in different countries. Many of which were outside of the EU. Being in the EU made no difference. Only about 1.5% of Brits work and live in the EU, a similar percentage of UK students study in the EU every year. So whilst it is commendable to want your kids to be able to experience work and life outside of the UK, the chances they will, is very very low. Even when we were in the EU, people just had no wish to leave the UK to work or study, no matter what the remaniacs would have you believe.
  5. I have no interest in what other people buy or how much. I buy what I can, when i can, and if i need to sell for a reason, then I will sell.
  6. Copy of letter sent to EU, (copies also received by Conservative Mp's and party members and thus in the public domain now.) EXPLANATORY NOTE UK PROPOSALS FOR AN AMENDED PROTOCOL ON IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND 2 October 2019 2 EXPLANATORY NOTE ON UK PROPOSALS FOR AN AMENDED PROTOCOL ON IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND 1. The UK sets out below a proposal for an agreement which should be acceptable to both sides and which delivers the objectives of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. This proposal would: a. be based first and foremost on our commitment to find solutions which are compatible with the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, the fundamental basis for governance in Northern Ireland; b. confirm our commitment to long-standing areas of UK / Ireland collaboration, including those provided for in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, but also others, in some cases predating the European Union: the Common Travel Area, the rights of all those living in Northern Ireland, and North / South cooperation; c. provide for the creation of an all-island regulatory zone on the island of Ireland, covering not just sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and agri-food rules but all goods, thus eliminating regulatory checks for trade in goods between Northern Ireland and Ireland; d. make this regulatory zone dependent on the consent of those who live under it, through the Northern Ireland institutions; e. ensure that Northern Ireland will be fully part of the UK customs territory, not the EU customs territory, after the end of the transition period, with all customs processes necessary to ensure compliance with the UK and EU customs regimes taking place electronically, and with the small number of physical checks needed conducted at traders’ premises or other points on the supply chain. This should be coupled with a firm commitment (by both parties) never to conduct checks at the border in future. (1) Overarching measures 2. The UK Government is absolutely committed to upholding the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Government has been clear that it will not, under any circumstances, impose a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. The Protocol should make a firm commitment to avoiding customs checks, regulatory checks, or related physical infrastructure at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. 3. The Protocol is not intended to provide a model which can be transferred to other aspects of the future relationship between the UK and the EU. It constitutes a response to the specific conditions of Northern Ireland and Ireland in the context of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. For example, the UK Government would not 3 see measures agreed here as setting a precedent for wider arrangements governing the movement of goods between the UK and EU, or in relation to specific entry points, such as Calais or Dover. 4. The previous Protocol contained, in Annex 4, a list of ‘level playing field’ measures. The amended Protocol represents a significant change to the customs relationship between the EU, Northern Ireland and the UK more broadly. The proposal set out in this note would see regulatory checks applying between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whilst Northern Ireland and Ireland would be in separate customs territories with customs controls applied to trade in goods between them. There is therefore no need for the extensive level playing field arrangements envisaged in the previous Protocol. Measures regarding open and fair competition are most appropriately discussed in the context of the UK-EU future relationship. 5. The arrangements set out in this explanatory note are intended to provide a basis for the permanent future relationship between the UK and EU in due course, with any adaptations appropriate to reflect that new relationship. (2) Regulatory compliance for goods 6. The introduction of a zone of regulatory compliance across Northern Ireland and the EU would remove the need for regulatory checks and related infrastructure at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, while enabling the UK and EU to maintain their own distinct customs regimes. 7. At the end of the transition period: a. Building on the existing practice established to maintain the Single Epidemiological Unit (SEU) on the island of Ireland, Northern Ireland would align with EU SPS rules, including those relating to the placing on the market of agri-food goods. Agri-food goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain would do so via a Border Inspection Post or Designated Point of Entry as required by EU law, building on the provisions that already exist to support the SEU. They would be subject to identity and documentary checks and physical examination by UK authorities as required by the relevant EU rules. b. In addition, Northern Ireland would also align with all relevant EU rules relating to the placing on the market of manufactured goods. This would reinforce the arrangements above by ensuring that regulatory checks can be implemented at the boundary of the zone, as appropriate and in line with relevant EU law, minimising the potential for non-compliance. This would be supplemented by on-the-market surveillance, as it is now. 4 c. The governance framework for this zone would be as set out in the previous Protocol. 8. The EU measures which would apply within the single zone of regulatory compliance are those set out in Annex 5 of the previous Northern Ireland Protocol, excluding those measures covering areas dealt with in our proposals on customs in Section (4) below. Northern Ireland would align with updates to the measures within scope and the Joint Committee would determine whether any new measures should be included within scope, as set out in Article 15(4) and (5) of the previous Protocol. 9. To support this system of controls at the boundary of the zone, traders moving goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland would need to notify the relevant authorities before entering Northern Ireland, in order to provide the necessary information to undertake the appropriate checks, and, where appropriate, prevent the entry of products prohibited or restricted by EU rules. At its boundary with other third countries, the EU currently captures much of this information through the application of the Union Customs Code. This would not be an appropriate approach under the amended Protocol, as Northern Ireland will be in the UK customs territory. A new notification requirement will therefore be needed to provide basic information to support the regulatory controls, covering: a. the nature of the goods in the consignment, and where they were produced; b. the people sending (exporting) and receiving (importing) the goods; and c. where the goods will depart and arrive. The precise arrangements for ensuring the effective operation of this approach would be decided through the Joint Committee before the end of the transition period. 10.As a result: a. The regulatory checks and controls taking place on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain would not apply when goods enter Ireland from Northern Ireland. The UK would not apply corresponding checks or controls on goods entering Northern Ireland from Ireland. b. Third country goods arriving in Northern Ireland would, as now and in the rest of the UK, be subject to full customs processes, as well as the required regulatory checks. 11.The UK Government is committed to protecting Northern Ireland’s position in the UK’s internal market, and guarantees that Northern Irish businesses and farmers will 5 continue to have unfettered access to the rest of the UK market. In support of this, the provisions in Article 7 of the previous Protocol should be maintained. For the same reason the UK also supports maintaining the provisions in Article 8 of the previous Protocol. (3) Consent 12.The zone of regulatory compliance will mean that Northern Ireland will be, in significant sectors of its economy, governed by laws in which it has no say. That is clearly a significant democratic problem. For this to be a sustainable situation, these arrangements must have the endorsement of those affected by them, and there must be an ability to exit them. That means that the Northern Ireland institutions – the Assembly and the Executive – must be able to give their consent on an ongoing basis to this zone (and to the Single Electricity Market, which raises similar issues). 13.Our proposal is that, before the end of the transition period, and every four years afterwards, the UK will provide an opportunity for democratic consent to these arrangements in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, within the framework set by the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. If consent is withheld, the arrangements will not enter into force or will lapse (as the case may be) after one year, and arrangements will default to existing rules. (4) Customs 14.It is a fundamental point that the UK will be exiting the EU Customs Union as a whole at the end of the transition period. This means that the UK and EU will operate distinct customs territories and that Northern Ireland will be part of the UK customs territory. 15.This means that the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland will be a customs border. That does not mean that customs checks and controls need to take place at, or even near, that border. Instead, we are making a proposal which ensures that no customs controls necessary to ensure compliance with the UK and EU customs regimes will take place at or near the border. This system will be underpinned by continuing close cooperation between UK and Irish authorities. 16.These arrangements will be based on the existing customs legislation of both parties, which will be the ultimate guarantee that an operable system is in place. But the intention is to make a series of simplifications and improvements to that legislation which will ensure that the commitment in the new Protocol to ensure no checks or infrastructure at the border will be fulfilled by the end of the transition period. 17.Specifically, our proposal consists of the following: 6 a. All goods movements between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be notified using a declaration; regulatory checks will not apply. Goods would be imported or exported between Northern Ireland and Ireland under either i) a transit mechanism or ii) a prior declaration mechanism. Goods moved under either mechanism would be under customs supervision by one or other customs authority from the point at which they are declared for export until they are cleared by customs in the territory of import for free circulation or placed under an alternative customs procedure. Cooperation between relevant authorities would help to ensure compliance. b. Under either process the relevant customs authority will be notified that the consignment has entered their customs territory. Either mechanism would link the movement of the consignment over the border with the information provided to the customs authority, which could identify any goods requiring customs interventions. Physical checks – which would continue to be required only on a very small proportion of movements based on riskassessment – could then take place at traders’ premises or other designated locations which could be located anywhere in Ireland or Northern Ireland. c. Special provision would be made for small traders to ensure that requirements on them could be simplified. These simplifications should respect the nature of economic activity between Northern Ireland and Ireland and should ensure that any special circumstances regarding the purpose for which goods move between customs territories, the nature of the goods, or the nature of the trader carrying out the movement, are all taken into account. Some small traders should be exempted from processes and from paying duty altogether. These measures would need to be carefully designed so they target the traders most in need of support while continuing to ensure compliance as far as possible. d. We also propose that the UK and EU should take an approach which ensures that goods movements between Ireland and Northern Ireland should not require entry or exit summary declarations. 18.These arrangements would be supported by a range of simplifications, which could be applied in the same way in Northern Ireland and Ireland, including: a. Trusted trader scheme. Authorised traders who meet agreed eligibility criteria could have access to benefits which make the customs process for goods moving from one territory to another easier to comply with. Authorities in both Ireland and Northern Ireland would commit to applying appropriate schemes, and could offer benefits to one another’s authorised traders, though would retain the flexibility to adjust these based on the specific circumstances of their territories. 7 b. Simplified customs procedures would be used to make it easier for eligible traders to submit declarations for their cross-border trade whilst maintaining appropriate compliance standards. c. Temporary admissions. To minimise burdens on individuals or firms carrying goods across the border temporarily, there should be an ambitious temporary admissions arrangement. 19.In a similar way to the role envisaged for the Joint Committee under the previous Protocol, the Committee would, before the end of the transition period, adopt decisions establishing the detailed rules for the implementation of these customs arrangements. 20.The UK and the EU should continue to apply their own legislation with respect to VAT and excise in their respective territories, with the UK’s legislation no longer subject to the EU’s VAT and excise legislation at the end of the transition period. The proposal would establish that import VAT and excise duty arising on goods moving between Ireland and Northern Ireland should not be paid or accounted for at the border and the administration of VAT and excise will not give rise to checks or controls at the border. The UK and the EU should cooperate to minimise evasion and ensure payment of the tax in the country where it is due and the Joint Committee should make decisions about any arrangements for that cooperation. 21.Alongside our formal proposals, the UK Government would aim to support the market for intermediaries, on the expectation that many traders will use customs brokers, hauliers, freight forwarders and fast parcel operators. To boost the intermediaries market serving the island of Ireland, and respond to increased demand, the Government would put in place a package of interventions, for example grant schemes in the sector. Conclusion 22.Taken together, these measures correspond to the core aims put forward by both the UK and EU. They constitute a proposal that: fulfils the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and avoids the need for checks or infrastructure at the border; maintains the integrity of the EU Single Market; supports the economy on the island of Ireland; preserves intact the UK customs territory; and provides for an extended transition and appropriate mechanisms for consent where Northern Ireland is bound by EU law. It is, as such, a proposal for an agreement which should be acceptable to both sides.
  7. Will Franken. I've just found an hilarious YouTube channel called Comedy Unleased. It's a London Comedy club that doesn't censor comics. Full of hilarious "right wing" comedians, ( most I've never heard of), doing some great sets. I've had tears running down my eyes at some of the non PC routines.
  8. One of the funniest things I've watched in a long time. (Ps. Try and spot the lefties in the front row, trying not to enjoy themselves)
  9. The CCTV footage that was shown at the PUBLIC inquest, showed exactly how this poor lady ended up how she did. She didn't get run over by the bus. The bus had already braked on seeing the van hitting people. Her body had ended up in that position after being thrown on the air. The inquest described all this. There are even news reports of her family turning away from the screens when this footage was aired during the inquest.
  10. Perhaps you can explain the origin of the photograph. When it was taken and where Also perhaps you could say what you think is wrong with the image that leads you to think it's fake? Which I assume from your post, you do.
  11. Nice that it's a win for Tommy? About bloody time. That'll teach Sweeney for trying to peddle his fake news agenda
  12. It's a guinea token. Not valuable, often used as a gambling chip in the 18th and 19th century.
  13. Actually you DO know someone who watches the Parliament channel. Me, I watch it every day, whilst eating my evening meal when I'm at home. According to BARB who collate viewing figures, BBC Parliament channel averages 277, 000 viewers per day. That's for the week 9th-15 Sept, (the latest figures available), the equivalent week the previous year was 106,000 viewers per day If you are talking about the 2017 Westminster attack, then I'm afraid you've lost the plot mate. Shot over two days? On Westminster Bridge? In the busiest city in the world? On no-one noticed? Just for the record, I have a work colleague who's cousin was just coming out of the tube station on the corner of the bridge just as it was kicking off. She immediately ran back down into the station. So to say it never happened because you've read something on the internet, is ...........well.......to be honest I have no words really.